

STATE-BUILDING IN AFGHANISTAN SINCE THE FALL OF TALIBAN

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**THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTERS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
IN STRATEGY AND DIPLOMACY**

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UNIVERSITI KEBANGSAAN MALAYSIA
BANGI**

2008

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the work in this thesis paper is my own except for quotations and summaries which have been duly acknowledged.

Date: 21 Mei 2008



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ABSTRACT

The thesis discusses on the state-building strategy implemented by the Afghan government and international body after U.S.-led forces intervention on Afghanistan in 2001. The war in Afghanistan began on October 7, 2001, in response to the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. The purpose of the invasion was to capture Osama bin Laden, destroy Al-Qaeda, and remove the Taliban regime which had provided support and safe harbor to Al-Qaeda. The war successfully removed the Taliban from power, although there has been resurgence in Taliban forces. Since the invasion, Afghanistan has become less stable due to increased warlord and Taliban activity, growing illegal drug production, and a fragile government with limited control outside of Kabul. The state-building efforts continue with a brave effort made with the Bonn process to create a national administration that enjoys genuine legitimacy with the majority of the people. The easy steps in the political process, electing a president and parliament, drafting a constitution, starting the training of an army, collecting heavy weapons from the former factions were implemented. But more is needed to actually create or restore a functioning state. Till 2007, the Afghan government and the international community failed to seize the opportunity to secure and stabilize Afghanistan after the quick victory over the Taliban. The lack of understanding and engagement with sub national governance institutions and the failure to develop the legitimacy of the state in Afghanistan, as well as insufficient financial resources and delays in distributing them left a vacuum which allowed the Taliban and insurgent group to regroup and slow the process of state-building in Afghanistan. It is concludes that, the elected national authorities need an assistance in recruiting training human resources and obtaining the funding and equipment necessary, to provide the security and other services the for the country towards the people desire. State-building success in Afghanistan can be achieved if an adequate planning was done by the central government with the assistance from international community or otherwise it will become a failed state again.

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